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The Consequences of Abortion
Restrictions for Women’s Healthcare
Maya Manian∗
Abstract
This Essay challenges the false assumption that abortion care
can be segregated from women’s medical care and targeted for
special restrictions without any effects on women’s health more
broadly. As a matter of medical reality, abortion cannot be
isolated from the continuum of women’s healthcare. Yet
policymakers and the public have failed to understand the
interconnectedness of abortion with other aspects of women’s
medical care. In fact, existing abortion restrictions harm women’s
health even for women not actively seeking abortion care, but these
impacts remain obscured. For example, antiabortion laws and
policies have spillover effects on miscarriage management,
prenatal care, and the treatment of ectopic pregnancies. Focusing
the public’s attention on the broader effects of abortion restrictions
on women’s health could help make visible the links between
abortion and healthcare. Furthermore, educating the public about
the full healthcare consequences of abortion restrictions could be
one key means to preserving access to abortion care. Repositioning
the law to recognize abortion care as an integral part of the
continuum of women’s medical needs is critical to protecting
women’s health.

∗ Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law. B.A.,
1995, University of Michigan; J.D., 1998, Harvard Law School. This Essay is an
expanded version of a presentation at Washington and Lee School of Law, Roe
at 40: The Controversy Continues, November 8, 2013. The presentation was
based in significant part on my article, Lessons from Personhood’s Defeat:
Abortion Restrictions and Side Effects on Women’s Health, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 74
(2013). Thanks to the organizers of the Washington and Lee Roe at 40
Symposium. For excellent services as Research Librarian, I wish to thank Amy
Wright.
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I. Introduction
Over the last several decades, as part of the movement
against abortion rights, abortion has become increasingly
stigmatized and isolated in women’s health. The current
segregation of abortion from the rest of women’s medical needs
brings us full circle back to questions raised by Roe v. Wade.1
Although Roe was rightly criticized as over-medicalizing the
abortion decision and empowering doctors rather than women, we
have now shifted to the opposite extreme of severing abortion
completely from the realm of women’s health.2 Thus far, the
public has failed to understand the interconnectedness of
abortion with women’s health generally. In fact, existing abortion
restrictions harm women’s health even for women not actively
seeking abortion care, but these effects remain obscured.3 For
example, antiabortion laws and policies have spillover effects on
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, Abortion, Contraception and the ACA: The
Realignment of Women’s Health, 55 HOW. L.J. 731, 762–64 (2011) (describing the
fact that abortion has been separated from other women’s health issues and
treated as a distinct issue).
3. See infra Part II (discussing the healthcare implications of abortion
legislation).
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miscarriage management, prenatal care, and the treatment of
ectopic pregnancies.4
As a matter of medical reality, abortion cannot be isolated
from women’s healthcare more broadly. We can see this by
unmasking the ripple effects of abortion restrictions that,
perhaps unintentionally, impede the provision of basic healthcare
other than abortion. Focusing the public’s attention on the
broader effects of abortion restrictions on women’s health could
help make visible the links between abortion and healthcare.
Uncovering these links could also create stronger support for
access to abortion and thereby better promote full healthcare
access for women. Repositioning the law to recognize access to
abortion care as integral to women’s medical needs remains
critical for protecting women’s health.
II. The Healthcare Consequences of Abortion Restrictions
Part of the popularity of antiabortion measures rests on the
faulty belief that those laws affect only the “bad” women who
seek abortions. This belief rests on the false assumption that
abortion can be isolated from other aspects of women’s health.
However, as a practical matter, abortion cannot be isolated from
the continuum of women’s medical care.5 Thus far, policymakers
have remained blind to the interconnectedness of abortion care
with women’s health generally.6 In fact, various abortion
restrictions already obstruct women’s healthcare, but the public
has failed to discern these harmful impacts.7 Below, I describe
how existing antiabortion government regulation detrimentally
affects care for women in the context of miscarriage management,
prenatal care, and the treatment of ectopic pregnancies.

4. Infra Parts II.A, II.B, II.D.
5. See Ikemoto, supra note 2, at 732–34 (arguing that a “whole-body”
understanding of women’s health-care is necessary for gender equality).
6. See id. at 738–39 (discussing the fact that the “abortion wars” have
focused political efforts on abortion legislation “to the near-exclusion of the rest
of women’s bodies”).
7. See infra Part II (discussing the impact abortion legislation has had on
miscarriage management, prenatal informational control and care, pregnancy
related care at sectarian hospitals, and ectopic pregnancy treatment).
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A. The Federal “Partial-Birth” Abortion Ban and Miscarriage
Management
The federal “partial birth” abortion ban, upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart,8 illustrates how laws
aimed at abortion impede medical care even for women not
actively seeking abortion care. The federal ban purports to
prohibit one type of abortion procedure called “partial birth”
abortion by its opponents, but known medically as intact D&E.9
Although the federal ban received much attention when the
Supreme Court upheld the law, the public has heard little about
the effects of this ban since its implementation. The discussion of
the law during the years of litigation gave the impression that a
ban on intact D&E would affect only a small number of women
seeking abortions late in their pregnancy.10 In fact, research on
the effects of the federal “partial-birth” abortion ban suggests a
much wider impact not only on abortion care, but also in the
management of miscarriages.
Lori Freedman, a leading researcher on the impact of
antiabortion policies on physicians, found that some physicians
who do not routinely provide abortions nevertheless feel
constrained by the ban.11 For example, one physician felt unable
to treat her patient in the safest manner she thought possible due
to a fear of violating the law while attempting to care for a
patient who was miscarrying during the second trimester of
pregnancy.12 The physician, Dr. B, who told this story
confidentially, explained as follows:
[The patient] was kind of in the process of delivering but it
wasn’t coming fast enough and she’s trying to hemorrhage to
death . . . . So I took her to the OR to basically do a D&E . . . so
I could get her to quit hemorrhaging. Well, you know the
8. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
9. Cynthia Gorney, Gambling with Abortion: Why Both Sides Think They
Have Everything to Lose, HARPER’S MAG., Nov. 2004, 33, 34.
10. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 155 (“A fetus is only delivered largely intact
in a small fraction of the overall number of D&E abortions.”).
11. Tracy A. Weitz, Lessons for the Prochoice Movement from the ‘Partial
Birth Abortion’ Fight, XXXIII CONSCIENCE, no. 1, 2012, at 26, 28.
12. See id. (describing the story of Dr. B, as told by Lori Freedman at a San
Francisco General Hospital Abortion Discussion Group).
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whole thing about the partial birth abortion. I mean, [it’s]
being born breech, it’s still kicking, it still has a heartbeat, its
head is stuck in her cervix. What would make sense would be
to punch a hole in the back of its skull, collapse its brain, get it
out of there and save the patient. But you’ve got all these
people in the OR that don’t know what the background
situation [is] . . . . And it’s just like that would’ve made perfect
sense to do that but I didn’t primarily because I was worried
that all these, you know, the techs and circulating nurses in
the OR are going to think, ‘Oh, Dr. B is a baby killer,’ you
know, ‘And she just did a partial birth abortion and doesn’t
everybody know that’s illegal?’13

In fact, technically this situation would not fall within the
scope of the federal “partial-birth” abortion ban because the
physician did not start the procedure with an intent to perform
an intact D&E.14 Nevertheless, regardless of the technicalities of
the law, the law’s effect has been to create a system in which
doctors feel circumscribed in the exercise of their medical
judgment.15 Professor Tracy Weitz argues that the law has
become its own “Panopticon,” a perpetual surveillance system
that inhibits not just abortion care but also the care of pregnant
women suffering from miscarriages.16
We do not know how often circumstances like these arise and
at what risks to patients because these stories are rarely told.
The federal “partial-birth” abortion ban and similar state bans
leave physicians with a Hobson’s choice—even in medical
situations where abortion care was not intended or sought—
pitting physicians’ medical judgment of what procedures would
best protect their patients against the threat of criminal sanction.

13. Id. at 28 (quoting from a presentation by Lori Freedman).
14. See id. (stating that the standard for criminal prosecution would
“probably” not be met because Dr. B lacked the requisite intent).
15. See id. (“[P]hysicians make decisions in the operating room based on
their fears about who might be watching, worried that onlookers will
misinterpret the situation.”). In this particular case, the physician completed a
disarticulation D&E (non-intact D&E) and was able to save the patient’s life.
See id. (describing the method of abortion used by Dr. B).
16. Id.
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B. Information Control and Prenatal Care

The regulation of information surrounding abortion care also
has spillover effects on medical care for pregnant women.
Oklahoma provides one stark example of information control as
reproductive control. On the same day that Oklahoma passed
legislation mandating that abortion patients undergo an
ultrasound, it also passed a law protecting physicians who fail to
disclose fetal anomalies to prenatal patients from tort liability.17
In other words, Oklahoma law forces unwanted information on
some pregnant patients while empowering physicians to conceal
wanted information from others. Furthermore, under this
liability preclusion law, physicians have no duty to disclose to
their patients that they would intentionally hide information
about fetal anomalies.18 Proponents of this legislation claim that
liability preclusion laws of this sort are antiabortion measures
only, thwarting women who would seek an abortion if they knew
of a fetal anomaly.19
In reality, laws that permit concealing information in the
context of prenatal care affect not only those women who may
consider terminating a pregnancy but also those who would not
choose an abortion but could use the information to better plan
17. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741.12 (2013) (“In a wrongful life action or a
wrongful birth action, no damages may be recovered for any condition that
existed at the time of a child’s birth if the claim is that the defendant’s act or
omission contributed to the mother’s not having obtained an abortion.”).
18. Id.
19. See Sherry F. Colb, An Oklahoma Abortion Law Raises New and
Different Rights Questions, FINDLAW (July 21, 2010), http://writ.news.find
law.com/colb/20100721.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2013) (analyzing liability
preclusion law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). As with any
medical intervention, physicians are generally expected to engage in counseling
that should be nondirective and should err on the side of disclosure. See AM.
MED. ASS’N COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, OP. 8.082: WITHHOLDING
INFORMATION FROM PATIENTS (2006), reprinted in AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF
MEDICAL ETHICS: COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS CURRENT OPINIONS
WITH ANNOTATIONS 253–54 (2008–2009 ed. 2008) (“Withholding medical
information from patients without their knowledge or consent is ethically
unacceptable.”); see also Sonia M. Suter, Note, Whose Genes Are These Anyway?:
Familial Conflicts Over Access to Genetic Information, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1854,
1894 (1993) (discussing the nondirective counseling approach used in genetic
counseling, in which patients are given full access to information so that they
can make informed decisions based on their values and beliefs).
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for their families. Dr. Rina Anderson’s story illustrates this
point.20 Dr. Anderson worked in private practice after her
OB/GYN residency.21 Her practice allowed her to provide
pregnancy terminations in cases of fetal anomalies.22 Dr.
Anderson regularly performed second trimester abortions in
these circumstances.23 Unfortunately, she found herself faced
with making the same difficult decision as her patients when,
during her second trimester of pregnancy, her doctor discovered a
fatal diagnosis.24
Dr. Anderson initially decided to terminate the pregnancy
since she had four months remaining and was told the fetus
would likely die in utero.25 Describing her own loss, Dr. Anderson
explained how she made a choice that surprised even her:
Actually, with our daughter we were faced with the same
decision. And in the end we actually ended up choosing
perinatal hospice. Kind of funny, how life takes you. We got all
of her diagnoses . . . . And I called my [practice] partner and
my friend and I’m like, “Okay, I’m coming to the hospital
tomorrow. I’m signing the forms. We’ll induce over the
weekend.”
And then I changed my mind. You know, for me there was
no—I don’t really know, you know, it was kind of the inner
voice that said, “Don’t do it. Maybe you might get time with
her or something.” And we ultimately, we did, we got ten days
with her.26

Dr. Anderson further explained her feelings about her decision
and the time she had left as follows:
We just waited to see whatever would happen. . . . And I
actually thought she was probably going to die in utero but she
didn’t . . . And then we ended up going into labor and having a
regular labor up here [in the hospital] . . . They had said with

20. LORI FREEDMAN, WILLING AND UNABLE: DOCTORS’ CONSTRAINTS
ABORTION CARE 86–89 (2010) [hereinafter FREEDMAN, WILLING AND UNABLE].
21. Id. at 90.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 77–78.
24. Id. at 86–87.
25. Id. at 87.
26. Id. at 87 (footnotes omitted).

IN
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one of the birth defects that she had, only about 3 percent
make it to term, so we felt pretty lucky from that respect.27

In telling her story, Dr. Anderson emphasized that “people can be
pro-choice and still choose other options, as she did,”28 but it is
only a choice if patients have the information to make that
decision. As stated in Canterbury v. Spence,29 a landmark case on
the law of informed consent, “the patient’s right of selfdecision . . . can be effectively exercised only if the patient
possesses enough information to enable an intelligent choice.”30
Without information, women and their families who would choose
to keep the pregnancy as Dr. Anderson did will not have the
opportunity to prepare emotionally for an infant’s serious illness
or death and thus, as in her case, appreciate the time they might
have; or to arrange appropriate care such as perinatal hospice; or
to take financial steps to provide for a disabled child.31
Furthermore, certain fetal conditions require special care in
utero. Early knowledge, decision-making, and intervention “[are]
key to a positive outcome.”32 In addition, in some cases testing
can reveal information about fetal characteristics that could
threaten the mother’s health.33 Once again, this assertedly
antiabortion law affects far more than simply abortion decisions.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 88 (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
30. Id. at 786.
31. See Jaime Staples King, Not This Child: Constitutional Questions in
Regulating Noninvasive Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis and Selective Abortion, 60
UCLA L. REV. 2, 65 (2012)
[Early prenatal screening information] could help inform prospective
parents’ decisionmaking regarding how best to care for their children
both while they are in the womb and after they are born. . . .
[A]dvanced knowledge regarding a child’s medical or behavioral
conditions can enable a parent to prepare for a child’s medical,
nutritional, educational, and social needs as early as possible.
See also Sujatha Jesudason & Julia Epstein, Editorial, The Paradox of
Disability in Abortion Debates: Bringing the Pro-Choice and Disability Rights
Communities Together, 84 CONTRACEPTION 541, 541–43 (2011) (arguing for a
reproductive justice approach to protecting disability rights and reproductive
rights, which includes access to information).
32. King, supra note 31, at 65.
33. See Jaime S. King, And Genetic Testing for All . . . The Coming
Revolution in Non-Evasive Prenatal Genetic Testing, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 599, 605–
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Furthermore, liability preclusion laws that provide an
incentive for physicians to withhold material information and
deviate from standards of care do little to address substantive
concerns about disability discrimination. Laws like Oklahoma’s
obfuscate more substantive conversation about the need for
government resources to support families with disabled children
so that real choices can be made.34 As early genetic screening
becomes easier and more effective, we are likely to see more
efforts towards information control as a method of regulating
abortion. These information prohibitions targeted at abortion
inevitably will affect all women and their families making
decisions in the context of prenatal care, regardless of what may
be their ultimate choice.35 The implications of information
restrictions on a wide array of pregnant women’s healthcare
options may raise concerns for the public if these side effects were
made visible.
C. “Conscience” Protection and Pregnancy-Related Care at
Sectarian Hospitals
Both federal and state laws—known as “conscience
clauses”—protect the right of institutions and individuals to
refuse to provide abortion care and other medical care to which
they conscientiously object.36 Conscience legislation shields
06 (2011) (discussing a variety of pregnancy complications which can be
discovered through prenatal testing).
34. See Jesudason & Epstein, supra note 31, at 541–42 (noting that “[a]ntichoice advocates tend to idealize disability while opposing the entitlement
programs and government funding of social services, such as state
developmental disability programs . . . that would make raising a child with a
disability more possible”).
35. For example, a number of states have already passed bans on abortion
if the reason for seeking the abortion is because of the fetus’s sex. See King,
supra note 31, at 26 n.128 (citing statutes from Illinois, Pennsylvania, and
Oklahoma prohibiting abortions based solely on the fetus’s sex). If states choose
to ban access to information on the sex of the fetus, such an information ban
could also affect health issues since some genetic diseases are sex-linked. See id.
at 26–30 (discussing sex-based abortion bans, and stating that they provide an
obstacle to a woman’s ability to access the necessary information to make an
informed abortion decision).
36. See Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 VA. L. REV. 1501,
1503 (2012) (describing and critiquing conscience legislation).
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institutional and individual actors from liability for their refusal
to provide care even if it contravenes accepted medical
standards.37 Although claiming to restrict only abortion provision,
the refusal policies of many privately owned sectarian hospitals,
ensured protection by conscience legislation, impede physicians’
ability to provide appropriate care for pregnant women who are
not actively seeking abortion care. In particular, pregnant women
with emergent conditions such as a miscarriage or an ectopic
pregnancy face risks to their health due to abortion restrictions.
Although other types of hospitals may also prohibit or limit
reproductive health services, Catholic-owned hospitals represent
the largest percentage of religiously affiliated hospitals,
“operating 15.2% of the nation’s hospital beds, and increasingly
they are the only hospitals in certain regions within the United
States.”38 This market share results in both Catholic and nonCatholic patients depending on Catholic hospitals for their care.
Yet Catholic hospitals neither inform women of the full extent of
the limits of their care, nor do they leave the decision of whether
and when to terminate a pregnancy to the patient even in the
context of a dire emergency.39 Research indicates that pregnant
women who are miscarrying, even long before viability, may face
serious risks to their health due to antiabortion policies at some
hospitals.40 The increased risks are primarily due to delays in
37. See id. (discussing the protections conscience clause legislation provides
to doctors who refuse to perform procedures they object to, even if they violate
institutional policies).
38. Lori R. Freedman, Uta Landy & Jody Steinauer, When There’s a
Heartbeat: Miscarriage Management in Catholic-Owned Hospitals, 98 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 1774, 1774 (2008) [hereinafter Freedman et al., When There’s a
Heartbeat]; see also FREEDMAN, WILLING AND UNABLE, supra note 20, at 119–20
(discussing the recent growth of Catholic hospitals’ presence across America).
39. See Freedman et al., When There’s a Heartbeat, supra note 38, at 1174–
75 (discussing the fact that Catholic hospitals follow their own internal protocols
as to whether or not an abortion can be performed without regard for the
woman’s decision, even in cases of medical emergency); JoNel Aleccia, Catholic
Hospital’s Religious Rules Led to Negligent Care Miscarriage, ACLU Says, NBC
NEWS (Dec. 2, 2013, 5:37 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/ catholichospitals-religious-rules-led-negligent-care-miscarriage-aclu-says-2D11 674429
(last visited Dec. 31, 2013) (describing the story of a pregnant woman who was
not told that her fetus had little chance of survival, despite the fact that the
pregnancy was endangering the woman’s health) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
40. See Freedman et al., When There’s a Heartbeat, supra note 38, at 1778
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care, in contravention to the accepted standards of care in
miscarriage management.41
A number of physicians employed at Catholic hospitals have
even confessed to subterfuge in the aim of protecting their
patients’ health.42 In one case, Dr. Brian Smits, a perinatologist,
reported resigning his position at a Catholic hospital rather than
be subject to hospital ethics committee decisions that harmed his
patients.43 Dr. Smits described the situation that instigated his
resignation and his surreptitious violation of protocol in order to
save his patient’s life:
I’ll never forget this; it was awful—I had one of my partners
accept this patient at 19 weeks. The pregnancy was in the
vagina. It was over. . . . I’m on call when she gets septic, and
she’s septic to the point that I’m . . . trying to keep her blood
pressure up, and I have her on a cooling blanket because she’s
106 degrees. And I needed to get everything out [of the
uterus]. And so I put the ultrasound machine on and there was
still a heartbeat, and [the ethics committee] wouldn’t let me
because there was still a heartbeat. This woman is dying
before our eyes. I went in to examine her, and I was able to
find the umbilical cord through the membranes and just
snapped the umbilical cord and so that I could put the
ultrasound—“Oh look. No heartbeat. Let’s go.” She was so sick
she was in the [intensive care unit] for about 10 days and very
nearly died. . . . Her bleeding was so bad that the sclera, the
white of her eyes, were red, filled with blood. . . . And I said, “I
(discussing the fact that women seeking abortion treatment at Catholic
hospitals “may receive treatment that is riskier and less comfortable than the
care provided in non-Catholic medical settings”).
41. See id. at 1775
According to the generally accepted standards of care in miscarriage
management, abortion is medically indicated under certain
circumstances in the presence of fetal heart tones. Such cases include
first-trimester septic or inevitable miscarriage, previable premature
rupture of membranes and chorioamnionitis, and situations in which
continuation of the pregnancy significantly threatens the life or
health of the woman.
42. See id. at 1776–77 (detailing several stories of physicians who
circumvented ethics committee dictates in order to follow the standards of care
they had learned in residency).
43. See FREEDMAN, WILLING AND UNABLE, supra note 20, at 118–21
(discussing Dr. Brian Smits’s experiences working in perinatology in a Catholic
hospital); see also Freedman et al., When There’s a Heartbeat, supra note 38, at
1777 (telling the same story of Dr. Smits).
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just can’t do this. . . . This is not worth it to me.” That’s why I
left.44

Dr. Smits had assumed that the prohibition of abortion at his
Catholic hospital would affect only his ability to offer abortions to
patients with fetal anomalies or medical contraindications to
pregnancy who would actively seek abortion care, which he could
readily refer to abortion clinics outside the hospital.45 He had not
expected “a disjuncture between what he considered to be the
standard of care in miscarriage management and what was
acceptable to his hospital’s ethics committee.”46 When asked what
eventually happened to his patient, Dr. Smits stated: “She
actually had pretty bad pulmonary disease and wound up being
chronically oxygen-dependent, and as far as I know, [she] still is,
years later. But, you know, she’s really lucky to be alive.”47
In addition to the miscarriage management scenarios,
sectarian hospitals may also deviate from standards of medical
care in the context of ectopic pregnancies. An ectopic pregnancy
occurs when a fertilized egg implants outside the uterus (such as
in the fallopian tube), has no chance of survival, and threatens
the life of the pregnant woman.48 The generally accepted
standard of care dictates termination of the pregnancy, which can
be done directly with medication that ends the pregnancy but
preserves the fallopian tube.49 However, strict interpretation of
Catholic doctrine would require the entire fallopian tube be
removed so the physician only indirectly kills the fetus.50
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Freedman et al., When There’s a Heartbeat, supra note 38, at 1777.
FREEDMAN, WILLING AND UNABLE, supra note 20, at 121.
Id.
Id. at 133.
See NAT’L HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, HEALTH CARE REFUSALS:
UNDERMINING QUALITY CARE FOR WOMEN 56–58 (2010), http://www.health
law.org/images/stories/Health_Care_Refusals_Undermining_Quality_Care_for_
Women.pdf (discussing ectopic pregnancies, the method of removal for ectopic
pregnancies, and the fact that ectopic pregnancies “by definition cannot be
brought to term”).
49. FREEDMAN, WILLING AND UNABLE, supra note 20, at 170 n.5 (stating
that the use of medication abortion preserves a woman’s use of both fallopian
tubes).
50. See id. (discussing the strict Catholic position on abortion); Marie A.
Anderson, et al., Ectopic Pregnancy and Catholic Morality: A Response to Recent
Arguments in Favor of Salpingostomy and Methotrexate, 11.1 NAT’L CATH.
BIOETHICS Q. 667, 681–83 (2011), http://johnpaulbioethics.org/FinalProofs.pdf
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Assuming two functioning fallopian tubes, the woman would lose
fifty percent of her fertility.51
The research on “conscience” refusals at Catholic hospitals
also belies the claim that a “health exception” to abortion
restrictions will be sufficient to preserve women’s health in the
case of medically necessary pregnancy terminations.52 Medicine,
particularly in the context of prenatal care, is not an exact
science.53 The overlay of vague legal rules on complex and time(discussing various Catholic positions on salpingostomy and methotrexate).
51. See FREEDMAN, WILLING AND UNABLE, supra note 20, at 170 n.5
(discussing the impact of the Catholic position on fertility); see also Angel M.
Foster et al., Do Religious Restrictions Influence Ectopic Pregnancy
Management? A National Qualitative Study, 21 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 104,
106–07 (2011) (recounting physicians’ reports and stories about the effect that
the Ethical and Religious directives for Catholic Health Care has had on their
treatment of ectopic pregnancies).
52. The exceptions to protect the woman’s health outlined in Catholic
hospital directives are vague and contested, and hospital ethics committees’
effectuation of Catholic doctrine has led to delays in care resulting in
psychological trauma, physical injury, and, in one recent case in Ireland, death.
See FREEDMAN, WILLING AND UNABLE, supra note 20, at 122–27 (discussing
history of the Catholic health care Directives, vagueness on whether the
exception only protects life or also health, and debates in implementing the
Directives); Shawn Pogatchnik, Savita Halappanavar Dead: Irish Woman
Denied Abortion Dies from Blood Poisoning, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 14, 2012,
4:20
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/14/savita-halappanavardeath-irish-woman-denied-abortion-dies_n_2128696.html (last visited Dec. 31,
2013) (describing abortion law in Ireland and the story surrounding the death of
a pregnant woman in Ireland who was denied an abortion during a miscarriage)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See also SABARATNAM
ARULKUMARAN ET AL., FINAL REPORT: INVESTIGATION OF INCIDENT 50278 FROM
TIME OF PATIENT’S SELF REFERRAL TO HOSPITAL ON THE 21ST OF OCTOBER 2012 TO
THE PATIENT’S DEATH ON THE 28TH OF OCTOBER, 2012, at 70 (2013) (stating, in the
government’s investigative report, that a key causal factor in Savita
Halappanavar’s death was “legislative factors affecting medical considerations”
that resulted in a “failure to offer all management options to a patient
experiencing inevitable miscarriage”).
53. See Maria Manriquez et al., Commentary, Abortion Bills Out of Line
with Accepted Standards of Prenatal Care, ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES (Apr. 6, 2012)
http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2012/04/06/abortion-bills-out-of-line-withaccepted-standards-of-prenatal-care/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2014) (“The practice of
medicine is as much an art as a science.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). This opinion piece by three OB/GYNs also discusses the side
effects of bans on abortion at 20 weeks, stating that Arizona’s 20-week ban on
abortion would affect all physicians practicing obstetrics even if they do not
provide abortions since the 20-week timeline “is simply not in line with routine
prenatal care” and may even instigate abortions without full information
“because of the arbitrary time constraints.” Id.
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sensitive medical decision-making remains insufficient to protect
women’s health.
D. Medication Abortion Restrictions and Ectopic Pregnancy
Similarly to concerns about treatment at sectarian hospitals,
state laws restricting access to medication abortion may impede
appropriate care for ectopic pregnancies. The United States Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) approved medication abortion—
termination of pregnancy by drugs as opposed to surgery—in
2000.54 Since that time, states have enacted several types of
legislation aimed at restricting access to medication abortion.55 A
few states have enacted legislation demanding that medication
abortion be provided in accordance with outdated FDA-approved
protocols rather than more recently developed regimens.56
Medication abortion is highly effective and safe.57 Between
2000 and 2011, 1.52 million women in the United States used
medication abortion.58 Of that group, only 612 suffered
complications requiring hospitalization.59 The drug used for a
medication abortion, sold in the United States under the brand
54. See GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: MEDICATION ABORTION
(2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MA.pdf (discussing
the state law restrictions created after the FDA’s approval of medication
abortions in 2000).
55. Oklahoma adopted one such law, which was nearly reviewed by the
U.S. Supreme Court. See id. (summarizing state legislation restricting
medication abortion).
56. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-729a (2011), invalidated by Okla. Coal. for
Reprod. Justice v. Cline, 292 P.3d 27 (Okla. 2012) (restricting the use of medical
abortions to the methods expressly allowed by FDA protocol).
57. See Heather D. Boonstra, Medication Abortion Restrictions Burden
Women and Providers—and Threaten U.S. Trend Toward Very Early Abortion,
GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Winter 2013, at 18 (stating that medication abortion’s
success rate, at 92–95%, is comparable to that of surgical abortion, and
summarizing data on safety).
58. See id. (discussing statistics for the use of medication abortions in the
United States).
59. See id. (noting that those hospitalizations occurred “most frequently
because they required a transfusion due to excessive bleeding”). From 2000 to
2011, there were eight documented cases of U.S. women dying from a severe
infection after taking the drug approved for medication abortion. Id. FDA
investigations into these deaths found no evidence of a causal connection
between Mifeprex and the infections. Id.
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name “Mifeprex,” actually consists of two different medications.
The first, mifepristone, blocks a hormone (progesterone)
necessary for a pregnancy to continue.60 “The second drug,
misoprostol, induces uterine contractions.”61 The FDA protocol for
Mifeprex approved in 2000 specified a 600 milligram (mg) oral
dose of mifepristone, and then two days later a 400 microgram
oral dose of misoprostol.62 The FDA regimen also approved use of
medication abortion for up to 49 days after a woman’s last
menstrual period.63
The FDA based these treatment protocols on a French
regimen developed in 1988 that was already out of date when it
was adopted in 2000.64 Researchers had confirmed that
alternative evidence-based treatment regimens were safe and
effective. These alternative regimens had numerous benefits,
including a significantly lower dose of mifepristone (200 mg as
opposed to 600 mg), enhanced patient privacy through in-home
administration of misoprostol, and effectiveness of medication
abortion through 63 days’ gestation.65 These alternative regimens
quickly became the accepted standard of care for medication
abortion as early as 2001.66
To understand how this came to be, it is important to
understand how medical practice related to the FDA’s regulation
of drugs generally operates in the United States. In American
medicine, it is standard medical practice to prescribe medications
“off label”—that is to prescribe medications in ways that deviate
from FDA-approved protocols.67 The American Medical
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 19.
65. Id.
66. See id. (noting that as far back as 2001 approximately 83% of U.S.
providers were no longer using the FDA-approved regimen); see also M.J.
Wiegerinck et al., Medical Abortion Practices: A Survey of National Abortion
Federation Members in the United States, 78 CONTRACEPTION 486, 488–89 (2008)
(noting that “alternative evidence-based regimens had already been shown to be
associated with a lower frequency of side effects”).
67. See Boonstra, supra note 57, at 19 (describing the prevalence of offlabel prescriptions, and stating that “[i]n an examination of 160 commonly used
medications, 21% of prescriptions were for off-label use”).
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Association strongly defends off-label (or “evidence-based”) uses,
and it is a widespread practice by physicians in every specialty of
medicine, far outside of abortion care.68 As evidence-based
practice develops, the off-label uses of a drug can become the
standard of care. In many cases, off-label prescriptions of
particular medications become widely entrenched in clinical
practice without being returned to the FDA for revised labeling,
to the point that strictly following FDA drug regimens could lead
to malpractice verdicts or professional discipline for violating the
standard of care.69
Despite alternative regimens becoming the accepted
standard of care in medication abortion, and despite evidence
that the availability of Mifeprex has appeared to accelerate the
trend to earlier abortion care, Oklahoma and several other states
have enacted legislation prohibiting off-label uses for abortioninducing drugs.70 There do not appear to be any other state laws
that prohibit off-label uses of drugs in any other medical
specialty, even for children.71 Oklahoma’s legislation is so broadly
68. See id. (“In an examination of 160 commonly used medications, 21% of
prescriptions were for ‘off-label’ use”); Use of Approved Drugs for Unlabeled
Indications, FDA DRUG BULLETIN, Apr. 1982, at 4, 4–5 (stating that
“‘unapproved’ or, more precisely, ‘unlabeled’ uses may be appropriate and
rational in certain circumstances, and may, in fact, reflect approaches to drug
therapy that have been extensively reported in medical literature”); David C.
Radley et al., Off-label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166
ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1021–26 (2006) (discussing the frequent use
of off-label medications).
69. See Christopher M. Wittich et al., Ten Common Questions (and Their
Answers) About Off-Label Drug Use, 87 MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS 982, 983
(2012) (discussing the fact that off-label drug use can “become the predominant
treatment for a given clinical condition”); Mark Herrmann & Pearson Bownas,
Keeping the Label Out of the Case, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 477, 486 (2009)
(discussing situations in which off-label use is the standard of care and
instances when it may be a violation of the standard of care not to prescribe offlabel); Veronica Henry, Off-Label Prescribing: Legal Implications, 20 J. LEGAL
MED. 365, 380 (1999) (“Off-label drug use often is medically appropriate and, in
some cases, may represent the standard of care. The failure to administer a
drug for an off-label indication when it is clearly in the patient’s best interest
creates potential liability.”) Furthermore, in many cases drug companies do not
seek approval for off-label uses “because of the expensive and time-consuming
process in obtaining the FDA’s approval.” Id. at 369.
70. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 54 (listing Arizona, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Ohio, and Texas as states that have statutes requiring FDA protocol
to be followed when medical abortion is used).
71. See Boonstra, supra note 57, at 19 (noting that off-label use of
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worded that it appeared not only to ban medication abortion in its
entirety but also to ban the safest method of treatment for ectopic
pregnancies.72 In particular, the statute prohibits the off-label use
of “any abortion-inducing drug,” which the statute defines to
include methotrexate.73 Yet the standard of care for treatment of
early ectopic pregnancy is the off-label use of methotrexate—the
go-to drug for medical as opposed to surgical termination of the
pregnancy.74
In 2012, the Oklahoma Supreme Court struck down the
statute. The trial court, which also held the statute
unconstitutional, stated that the law was “so completely at odds
with the standard that governs the practice of medicine that it
medication is common in pediatric care since children are typically excluded
from clinical drug studies); Hank Greely, Cline v. Oklahoma Coalition for
Reproductive Justice: A Fascinating Supreme Court (Sort of) Abortion, FDA,
and First Amendment Case, STANFORD LAW SCH. (July 4, 2013),
http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/lawandbiosciences/2013/07/04/cline-v-oklahomacoalition-for-reproductive-justice-a-fascinating-supreme-court-sort-of-abortionfda-and-first-amendment-case/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2014) (noting that neither
federal nor state statutes prohibit off-label uses of medications, with the
exception of certain performance enhancing drugs that are treated as controlled
substances due to abuse by athletes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
72. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-729a (2011), invalidated by Okla. Coal. for
Reprod. Justice v. Cline, 292 P.3d 27 (Okla. 2012). The statute provides in
relevant part:
No physician who provides RU-486 (mifepristone) or any abortioninducing drug shall knowingly or recklessly fail to provide or
prescribe the RU-486 (mifepristone) or any abortion-inducing drug
according to the protocol tested and authorized by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration and as authorized in the drug label for the RU486 (mifepristone) or any abortion-inducing drug.
Id. § 1-729a(C) (emphasis added).
73. See id. § 1-729a(A)(1) (“‘Abortion-inducing drug’ means a medicine . . .
dispensed with the intent of terminating the clinically diagnosable pregnancy of
a woman . . . . This includes off-label use of drugs . . . such as misoprostol
(Cytotec), and methotrexate.”).
74. Wiegerinck et al., supra note 66, at 488 (noting that methotrexate has
never been labeled for use as an abortifacient by the FDA, but “it has long been
used off-label for several indications, including management of early ectopic
pregnancy”); Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Medical Treatment of Ectopic
Pregnancy: A Committee Opinion, 100 FERTILITY & STERILITY 638, 639 (2013)
(“Medical treatment protocols for MTX were established in the late 1980s and
have become widely accepted as primary treatment for ectopic pregnancy.”).
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can serve no purpose other than to prevent women from obtaining
abortions and to punish and discriminate against those women
who do.”75 In a terse memorandum opinion, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court declared the legislation facially unconstitutional,
relying solely on the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.76
The state petitioned for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court
and, on June 27, 2013, the Court granted the petition. However,
in a surprising move, the U.S. Supreme Court utilized a
procedure provided for in Oklahoma law asking the state court
for a legal interpretation of the state’s statute. The Court placed
the case on hold pending the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s
response to several questions posed to it by the U.S. Supreme
Court, including whether the Oklahoma statute bans
methotrexate to treat ectopic pregnancies.77 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court concluded that the statute “restricts the longrespected medical discretion of physicians in the specific context
of abortion” and in fact bans all medication abortions, including
medical termination of ectopic pregnancy by off-label use of

75. Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Justice v. Cline, No. CV-2011-1722 (Okla. Dist.
Ct. Okla. City May 11, 2012) (order granting summary judgment).
76. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). See also Okla. Coalition for Reprod. Justice v.
Cline, 292 P.3d 27, 27 (Okla. 2012) (stating that the holding in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey is controlling on the facts of
the case and that Supremacy Clause binds the Oklahoma Supreme Court to
follow that holding).
77. Cline v. Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Justice, 133 S. Ct. 2887 (2013) (mem.).
The Court’s order reads, in full:
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. This Court, pursuant
to the Revised Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Okla.
Stat., Tit. 20, § 1601 et seq. (West 2002), respectfully certifies to the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma the following question: Whether H.B.
No. 1970, Section 1, Chapter 216, O.S.L. 2011 prohibits: (1) the use of
misoprostol to induce abortions, including the use of misoprostol in
conjunction with mifepristone according to a protocol approved by the
Food and Drug Administration; and (2) the use of methotrexate to
treat ectopic pregnancies. Further proceedings in this case are
reserved pending receipt of a response from the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma.
Id.
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methotrexate.78 The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the
case as improvidently granted.79
Although the Supreme Court has yet to opine on restrictions
on medication abortion, the Oklahoma case once again illustrates
how laws apparently targeted at abortion inevitably affect other
related areas of women’s medical care.
***
All of the above stories illustrate that abortion care cannot be
isolated from women’s healthcare as a whole. Any pregnant
woman is a potential abortion patient. Limits on access to
abortion care place pregnant women’s health and personal
decision-making at risk regardless of whether they are actively
seeking abortion care.
III. Roe v. Wade and Abortion as Medical Care
The current segregation of abortion from women’s healthcare
brings us back to questions that have long been raised by Roe v.
Wade. One oft-heard criticism of Roe is that it overemphasized
abortion as a medical decision and the physician’s role in that
decision.80 Although Roe was rightly criticized as overmedicalizing abortion decision-making and empowering doctors
rather than women, we have now shifted to the opposite extreme.
Today, abortion is hardly considered medical care at all. The
Supreme Court’s most recent abortion decision, Gonzales v.
Carhart,81 bears a striking contrast to Roe in this regard. In
Carhart, the Supreme Court described the abortion decision as
purely political in nature and one that is made as a matter of
“convenience.”82 The Court ignored extensive medical evidence on
78. Cline v. Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Justice, 313 P.3d 253, 262 (Okla. 2013).
79. Cline v. Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Justice, 134 S. Ct. 550, 550 (2013).
80. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Doctors, Patients and the
Constitution: A Theoretical Analysis of the Physician’s Role in “Private”
Reproductive Decisions, 63 WASH. U. L. REV. 183, 197–201 (1985) (discussing the
fact that the language in Roe “portrays the doctor, and not the patient as the
primary decision-maker in the abortion context”).
81. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
82. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 186–87 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
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the health reasons for employing the banned procedure, leaving it
to legislatures and courts, rather than physicians and their
patients, to determine how best to protect women’s health.83
Yet many types of abortion restrictions have unintended
consequences that impede the provision of basic healthcare for
women.84 Focusing the public’s attention on the side effects of
various antiabortion laws could help to unmask the links between
abortion and women’s healthcare. The public needs more
education about how attacks on abortion affect women along a
spectrum of medical needs. Efforts in this direction could help
bring back “a whole body, experience-based understanding of
women’s health that is predicate to gender equality and civic
participation”—a view of women’s health that Professor Lisa
Ikemoto argues is being eroded under current health policies.85
Surfacing the spillover effects of abortion restrictions could
help decision-makers better see and understand the links
between abortion and women’s healthcare. Realigning abortion
with healthcare and repositioning the law to recognize access to
abortion care as a critical part of the continuum of women’s
medical needs is essential to protecting women’s health. As
Professor Jessie Hill has argued, “describing abortion as an
aspect of health care may get members of the public to recognize
the intrusive and harmful nature of anti-choice legislation, much
of which . . . directly regulates the intimate relationship between
physician and patient.”86 The public appears to be sympathetic to
criticism of government intrusion into healthcare decisionmaking, even where abortion may be an aspect of those

83. See id. at 164–68 (majority opinion) (discussing the deference that must
be given to the legislature and the fact that “[t]he Act is not invalid on its face
where there is uncertainty over whether the barred procedure is ever necessary
to preserve a woman’s health”).
84. Of course, restrictions on abortion also detrimentally affect women’s
health since many women may resort to riskier illegal measures to terminate
unwanted pregnancies when legal abortion is unavailable. See Dan Grossman et
al., The Public Health Threat of Anti-Abortion Legislation, CONTRACEPTION
(forthcoming) (discussing the rise of “abortion self-induction” in Texas after
abortion access was restricted within the state).
85. Ikemoto, supra note 2, at 732.
86. B. Jessie Hill, Abortion as Health Care, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Dec. 1, 2010,
at 48, 49.
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decisions.87 To be clear, I am not arguing that abortion is only a
medical issue, as Roe incorrectly claimed. Rather, seeing and
understanding abortion as healthcare offers one important and
useful approach for bolstering access to safe and legal abortion,
along with emphasis on the importance of abortion rights for
preserving women’s equality and liberty.
IV. Conclusion
Abortion is both a social and a medical issue. Although some
segments of the public have been supportive of legislation that
appears to target only abortion, that support may wane if the
detrimental effects of these laws on women’s health were more
fully understood. As a practical matter, abortion cannot be
isolated from women’s healthcare. Educating the public about the
interconnectedness of abortion care with other aspects of women’s
medical care remains crucial to unmasking the links between
abortion and healthcare. Laws attacking abortion, inevitably,
have wider consequences for women’s health.

87. For example, the defeat of an antiabortion “personhood” proposal in
Mississippi appeared due at least in part to “concerns that the measure would
empower the government to intrude in intimate medical decisions” related to
pregnancy care and reproductive healthcare. Denise Grady, Medical Nuances
Drove ‘No’ Vote in Mississippi, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2011, at D1.

